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RECENT CASE NOTES
cess" clause has been extended to protect the individual from contrary action on
the part of the states in the following instances: freedom from the infliction of
cruel and inhuman punishment;' 0 the correct application of the law to the
facts:11 protection against the presentation of perjured testimony;1 2 the require-
ment of presence of witnesses13 and of a public trial;14 the right to have counsel
and a reasonable opportunity to prepare a case;' 5 and freedom from the
mob domination of a trial.16
It is submitted that the extension of due process of the 14th amendment
to include the privilege against self-incrimination is a desirable one, in view
of the fact that it may tend to curb the practice of state police officers from
obtaining confessions by clearly unreasonable means. H. B.
BANKS AND BANKING-TRusTs-SPECIAL DaEPosrrs.-A trust company estab-
lished a segregate savings investment department which was to receive de-
posits, invest them in loans and high grade securities, keep these loans and
securities separate from other assets of the company, treat them as a special
fund which was at all times to equal the total amount of investment deposits
outstanding, and pay 571o interest on the funds received, any withdrawals to
be paid only out of the special fund and to be subject to statutory notice
restrictions on time deposits enforceable at the option of the bank. For a
period of 17 months after the inception of the plan the bank received monies
from the savings investment depositors but did not in any manner identify
them, comingling them with its general funds. Nor did published statements
of resources and liabilities made by the bank during this period indicate that
any particular securities had been segregated for the particular benefit of the
savings depositors. During the period, however, the officers of the trust com-
pany selected certain mortgage notes owned by the bank and placed on each
a band bearing the legend "Savings Investment Mortgages," and marked on
the ledger sheets of the depositary after each mortgage note so marked the
letter "S", but no assignment or endorsement in any form was made upon
the notes so banded. The trust company failed and the depositors into the
fund sought to impress a trust upon the assets so set aside. Held, that the
deposits were special deposits made for a specific purpose, creating a trust in
favor of such depositors, entitling them to a preferred claim as to the securi-
ties so segregated.1
A trust under the classified definition meant, among other things, that the
trustee had legal title,2 was strictly accountable to a court for his management
of the fund,3 and was bound to keep the res separate and distinct from any
10 Davis v. Berry (1914), 216 Fed. 413.
Ilnternational Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1930), 280 U.
S. 291.
12 Mooney v. Holohan (1935), 294 U. S. 103, 112, 55 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340.
13 United States v. Angell (1881), 11 Fed. 34, 43.
14 Gaines v. Washington (1928), 277 U. S. 81, Frank v. Mangum (1915),
237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582.
15Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55.
16Moore v. Dempsey (1923), 261 U. S. 86, 91, 43 Sup. Ct. 265; Frank v.
Mangum (1915), 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582.
1 Singlinger v. Dept. Financial Institutions (1936), 199 N. E. 715.
2 Am. Law Inst. Restatement of Trusts, sec. 2.
3 Am. Law Inst. Restatement of Trusts, sees. 164, 165, and 187.
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other funds at his command, 4 while the cestui had equitable title, 5 was entitled
to all benefits accruing from the fund,6 and, with the exception of the case
of breach of trust by the trustee, bore all losses suffered by the res.7 But the
term trust is today often used to describe a relation quite unlike that existing
between a trustee and a cestul under a strict trust. This is a consequence of
a tendency on the part of the courts to use the trust as a device to reach what
is considered an equitable result in a particular case, whether the facts of
that case contain all the necessary elements of a strict trust or not. Resulting
trusts and constructive trusts have long been cases in point and the practice
of using the trust as an equitable device to obtain a desired end has been
widely adopted in this country in cases involving special deposits in banks.
These decisions are generally based upon a finding that a fiduciary relation
was intended by the parties. Needless to say, the courts have often been hard-
pressed to reconcile the results reached in these cases with the characteristics
generally attributed to the strict trust and they have often been criticized for
using the trust device as a means of explaining results reached in cases in
which the facts did not satisfy the requirements of a trust, if the term is con-
strued in its literal sense.
Deposits are presumed by the courts, in recognition of general banking
practice, to be general, 8 but they will find that a fiduciary relation exists,
entitling the depositor to a preference over the general creditors, if upon an
examination of the facts it is found that an agency,9 bailment,' 0 or trust 11
relation was actually intended by the parties. The ordinary special deposit,
where the depositary is, by the terms of the agreement, to keep the funds
separate, presents little difficulty, as in these cases the court can justifiably find
that a bailment or agency relation was created. However, when the agree-
ment provides for no segregation of the original funds, but merely states the
purpose for which the funds are to be used, the courts experience difficulty in
justifying a finding that one of the above relationships was intended, as a
more detailed examination of these theories reveals.
One method which has been used by the courts in such cases is to find that
an agency relation was intended.1 2 But can an agency relation be said to
exist when a bank accepts the funds, commingles them with its own, and uses
the commingled deposit for its own benefit and profit? Strict agency law does
not permit the agent to profit from the use of funds of his principal.13 Fur-
4 Am. Law Inst. Restatement of Trusts, sec. 179.
5 Am. Law Inst. Restatement of Trusts, sec. 2.
6 Subject, of course, to the terms of the creating instrument. Am. Law Inst.
Restatement of Trusts, sec. 128.
7 Am. Law Inst. Restatement of Trusts, secs. 204, 205.
8 Hjelle v. Veigel (1926), 169 Minn. 173, 210 N. W 891, Busher v. Fulton
(1934), 128 Ohio St. 485, 191 N. E. 752; 1 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th ed.
1928), sec. 186.
9 Duncan v. Anderson (1926), 120 Okla. 194, 250 Pac. 1018; Pacific Bldg.
& Loan v. Central Bank & Trust Co. (1923), 127 Wash. 524, 221 Pac. 313.
10 Montague v. Pacific Bank (1897), 81 Fed. 602; Stultz v. Gordon (1929),
89 Ind. App. 611, 167 N. E. 564.
11Titlow v. Sundquist (1916), 234 Fed. 613; Blummer v. Scandinavian
Am. State Bank (1926), 169 Minn. 89, 210 N. W. 865. For a more detailed
analysis of the use of these three devices see 8 So. Cal. L. R. 122.
12 An agent can hold legal title to property for his principal. Agency
Restatement, sec. 423.
13 Agency Restatement, sec. 13.
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ther, granting that such a fiduciary relation exists, the question arises: should
a principal who allows an agent to commingle his funds be permitted to claim
a preference in event of the insolvency of that agent?
The objection to the use of the theory of bailment in these cases is that
ordinarily title has passed to the bank and that the parties did not intend the
return of the original subject matter, strict bailment law requiring that title
stay in the bailor and, as a rule, demanding that the original subject matter
be returned. Under the fungible goods doctrine, however, there may be a
bailment of grain where the original subject matter was not to be returned,
but only grain of a like kind and quality.14 This doctrine has been applied
to cases involving the return of corporate shares, 1 5 liberty bonds where only
the same kind and issue were to be returned,1 6 and some cases intimate that
it might be applied to deposits of money.17
The trust device is probably more used than either of the above to estab-
lish preferred claims in favor of depositors for a specific purpose who have
not provided that their funds be segregated. A trust relationship has been
found where such deposits were made to meet some particular expenditures,' 8
for security,19 for remittance, 20 or to be paid over on the happening of a
certain event.2 1 Such cases seem to be the weight of authority in this country,
although there is a minority view which follows the English rule, 2 2 denying
the existence of such a fiduciary relationship when there has been no actual
segregation. 2 3 These latter cases would seem to be more logical in result,
as they take cognizance of the objection most often raised to the use of a
trust in such situations, namely, that there is no definitely ascertainable res
upon which to erect a trust, unless the obligation of the bank to the depositor
be regarded as a chose in action constituting a sufficient res. Further, there
appears to be no reason why mere evidence of the use to which such funds
are to be put should be sufficient to create a specific deposit, for it is entirely
consistent with the debtor-creditor relationship that the creditor instruct the
debtor for what the money is to be used.
14 Rice v. Nixon (1884), 97 Ind. 97, Barrows v. Wampler (1899), 24 Ind.
App. 578, 57 N. E. 262. See note 54 A. L. R. 1166.
15 Fosdick v. Green (1875), 27 Ohio St. 484; Taussig v. Hart (1874), 58
N. Y. 425.
16 Stultz v. Gordon (1929), 89 Ind. App. 611, 167 N. E. 564. Noted 5 Ind.
Law Journal 216.
17 Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Assn. v. Cal. Say. & Comml. Bank
(1933), 218 Cal. 261, 22 Pac. (2nd.) 704, 709; Flach v. Hood (1933), 204 N. C.
337, 168 S. E. 520, 522.
18 Craig v. Bank ,of Granby (1922), 210 Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W. 507;
Hitt Fireworks Co. v. Scandinavian-Am. Bank (1922), 121 Wash. 261, 209
Pac. 680.
19 Woodhouse v. Crandall (1902), 197 11. 104, 64 N. E. 292; Flint Road
Cart Co. v. Stephens (1888), 32 Mo. App. 341.
20 State v. Grills (1912), 35 R. I. 70, 55 AtI. 281; Cutler v. Am. Exch.
Bank (1889), 113 N. Y. 593, 21 N. E. 710.
21 Shopert v. Ind. Natl. Bank (1908), 41 App. 474, 83 N. E. 515, Steil% v.
Kemp (1916), 132 Minn. 44, 155 N. W 1052.
22 In Re Barned's Banking Co. (1870), 39 L. J. (Ch.) 635, limiting Farley
v. Turner (1857), 26 L. J. (Ch.) 710.
23 First Nat. Bank v. City of Miami (1934), 69 Fed. (2nd.) 346;,Borgess
Hosp. v. Union Industrial Trust & Savings Bank (1933), 265 Mich. 156, 251
N. W 363, Beecher v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. (1921), 239 Mass. 48, 131
N. E. 338.
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It was found in the instant case, upon construing the language of the con-
tract, that the parties intended a trust relationship to exist, the decision being
based upon the rules set forth in the pass book to the effect (1) that the de-
posits were to be invested in approved securities which were to be kept
separate from all other assets of the company and treated as a special fund,
(2) that the company was to keep in the special fund a total of securities and
cash equal to the total savings investments; and (3) that the depositors were
to be paid only out of the separate assets of the fund and not out of the other
funds of the depositary. The court's decision may well be questioned, how-
ever, when it is considered that the contract also provided (1) that 53/2o
interest was to be paid to the depositors; (2) that all earnings of the fund
were to go to the company and not to the depositors; and (3) that with-
drawals would be paid on demand, unless the bank saw fit to invoke the
statutory notice requirements. While the payment of interest is not conclusive
proof of a debtor-creditor relationship, it is one of the strongest indicia that
a loan and not a trust was intended. 2 4 This presumption is strengthened in
the instant case by the fact that the bank was to be entitled to the earnings
of the fund, which fact is certainly inconsistent with a finding that a fiduciary
relationship was intended. Further, it has been held that when a depositor
has the right to withdraw from his account for all purposes, as here, such
account shall be deemed a general deposit, title thereto passing to the bank.2 5
The reservation of the right to invoke the statutory notice requirements on
withdrawals would also seem to indicate that a debtor-creditor relationship
was intended, as the savings investment depositors were thereby placed in the
same class as the ordinary savings depositor in this respect.
When, however, the contract is viewed in the light of the later acts of the
parties, the court's finding that it was the intention of the bank that a
fiduciary relationship be created becomes even more untenable. From the date
of origin of the plan until the bank closed, the company commingled the savings
investment deposits with its general funds. This action is consistent only with
an understanding by the bank that these deposits were general in character.
Further, while the funds were so commingled, and before the notes were banded,
it would have been impossible for the depositors, as cestuis, to bear the losses
to the savings investment fund, as there was no such fund in existence. An-
other fact which evidences an understanding by the bank that the deposits
were general is that, if at any time while the funds were commingled, sufficient
cash had been segregated to establish a fund to repay the savings depositors
in full, the bank would have fallen below the statutory requirements as to
cash reserves. Thus it would seem that one party to the contract, namely the
depositary, at no time considered the depositors to be other than general
creditors, despite the court's finding to the contrary. M. E. W
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-PEDDLER.-The town of
Sellersburg passed an ordinance levying a license tax of twenty-five dollars per
year on peddlers and hawkers. The defendant was arrested and charged with
peddling without having procured a license. The defendant was employed
24 Cline v. Union Trust Co. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 296, 189 N. E. 643, 647,
Mo. etc. v. Holland Banking Co. (1927), 290 S. W 101, 103, Old Colony v.
Puritan (1923), 244 Mass. 259, 138 N. E. 321, 323.
25 In re North Missouri Trust Co. (1931), 39 S. W. (2nd) 412.
